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Abstract 
This paper uses the Schools and Staffing Survey to examine the determinants of teacher salaries 
in the U.S. using a spatial econometric framework.  These determinants include teacher salaries 
in nearby districts, union activity in the district, union activity in neighboring districts, and other 
school district characteristics.  The results confirm that salaries for both experienced and 
beginning teachers are positively affected by salaries in nearby districts.  Investigations of the 
determinants of teacher salaries that ignore this spatial relationship are likely to be mis-specified.  
Including the effects of union activity in neighboring districts, the study also finds that union 
activity increases salaries for experienced teachers by as much as 18-28 percent but increases 
salaries for beginning teachers by a considerably smaller amount.   
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Introduction 
Teacher pay is an issue that has received much attention from researchers, politicians, 
and the general public.  Teacher pay is important for several reasons.  For one, state and local 
governments spend a large portion of their budgets on education.  For the 2005-06 school year, 
public school districts in the U.S. had current expenditures per pupil of $9,138, with more than 
60 percent of current expenditures going toward teacher salaries and benefits (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2006a).  Teacher pay is also important because of the sheer number of public school 
teachers in the U.S.  In 2006, full-time equivalent employment of elementary and secondary 
teachers by state and local governments was more than 4.6 million, making teachers by far the 
largest group of state and local government employees (U.S. Census Bureau 2006b).  Teacher 
pay is also likely to affect the ability of school districts to recruit and retain quality teachers as 
suggested by a sizable literature in education finance (e.g. Murnane and Olsen 1989, 1990; Figlio 
1997, 2002; Clotfelter et al. 2008).   
 This paper uses a spatial econometric framework to examine the determinants of teacher 
salaries in the U.S.  These include teacher salaries in nearby districts, union activity in the 
district, union activity in neighboring districts, and other school district characteristics.  A large 
literature has examined the determinants of teacher salaries, with many such studies especially 
interested in the effects of unions.  These studies generally find that unions increase teacher 
salaries.  Only a handful of these studies, however, account for the possible effects of teacher 
salaries in nearby districts.  Because teachers can leave low-paying districts for higher-paying 
districts nearby, teacher salaries are very likely to be positively affected by teacher salaries in 
nearby districts.   
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 The few studies that examine the effects of teacher salaries in nearby districts provide 
analysis of individual states.  Important insights, however, may be missed by investigating only 
school districts from a single state.  To my knowledge, this paper is the first to examine teacher 
salaries in a spatial econometric framework for the 48 contiguous U.S. states.  This paper also 
devotes considerable attention to the effect of unions on teacher salaries and utilizes several 
different measures of union activity.  In particular, this paper differentiates between the effects of 
union activity in the district and union activity in the state.   
    
Previous Literature and Theoretical Framework 
 Numerous research studies investigate the determinants of teacher salaries.  Many of 
these focus specifically on how teacher unions affect teacher salaries.  Lipsky (1982), Ehrenberg 
and Schwarz (1986), and Freeman (1986) provide early reviews of the literature.  Theory 
suggests that the effect of unions on the level and structure of teacher salaries should be 
determined by union goals and bargaining power.  A number of models have emerged in 
attempts to explain union goals (Hirsch and Addison 1986; Kaufman 2002).  For example, union 
leaders have been assumed to maximize the total wage bill, the utility of a representative union 
member, or the utility of the median union member.  Furthermore, the goals of union leaders 
may often differ from the goals of union members (Pencavel 1991; Booth 1995).  Union leaders 
may be first and foremost concerned with the survival and growth of the union instead of 
member well-being.  Bargaining power derives from numerous factors, including state collective 
bargaining laws, the extent of organizing, political support, and financial ability to pay. 
Previous empirical studies typically regress the log of average salaries on union activity 
measures and other characteristics of the school district and local labor market.  Results vary 
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considerably across studies in part due to the measures of teacher salaries and union activity that 
are used, differences across states, and differences over time.  A few studies, such as Lovenheim 
(2009), find little to no effect of union activity on teacher salaries, but most recent studies find at 
least a modest positive effect.  Hoxby’s (1996) finding of a roughly five percent effect of 
collective bargaining representation on average teacher salaries is fairly representative of most 
studies.  Still, at least a few studies find union effects as large as 20 percent of wages (e.g. Baugh 
and Stone 1982; Zwerling and Thomason 1995).   
A few studies also recognize that teacher unions might differentially affect the salaries of 
teachers within a given district.  In other words, unions not only affect the average level of 
salaries but also the distribution of salaries within a district.  Holmes (1976) finds that unions 
increase both the return to experience and the return to education within a district.  Similarly, 
Delaney (1985) finds that collective bargaining increases the salary differential between 
experienced teachers and inexperienced teachers.  Zwerling and Thomason (1995) and Lentz 
(1998) also find that while unions have a positive and significant effect on the salaries of 
teachers earning the highest salary in a district, unions have a small (though still positive) and 
statistically insignificant effect on the lowest salary in a district.  Babcock and Engberg (1999) 
and Ballou and Podgursky (2002) also suggest that the average levels of teaching experience and 
education in a district affect the returns to experience and education as well. 
The effect of teacher unions on intra-district salary differentials is often explained by 
appealing to a median voter model.  If union preferences are determined by a simple-majority 
vote, individual preferences are single-peaked, and there is only one outcome to be decided, the 
preferences of the median voter will be decisive.  Virtually all public school districts, including 
those without collective bargaining, pay teachers according to a salary schedule that maps salary 
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to teaching experience and education.  In the absence of union pressures, district administrators 
may dictate a salary schedule that is more appealing to marginal teachers than median teachers, 
with the marginal teachers likely being those with little or no teaching experience and without 
advanced degrees.  However, the union’s preferred salary structure may be heavily influenced by 
the preferences and hence characteristics (i.e. experience and education) of the median teacher in 
the district.  According to data tabulated from the 1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Survey 
(SASS) Teacher Survey, about half of public school teachers in the U.S. had advanced degrees 
and the average experience was about fifteen years.   
Because there are multiple dimensions to union contracts (returns to experience, returns 
to education, the level of fringe benefits, etc.), the median voter model may not adequately 
explain the salary determination process within districts.  Having multiple choice variables 
means that there is likely no single median voter whose preferences are decisive.  Instead, it may 
be useful to more generally view union preferences as resulting from a majority coalition of 
teachers.  Union cohesion may even require that there be a super-majority coalition.  Even with 
multiple choices to be made, though, it still seems likely that teachers with median levels of 
experience and education will be important members of the majority coalition and will push for a 
salary structure that benefits them.  Teachers with little or no experience are the ones most likely 
to be left out of the majority coalition for several reasons.  First, inexperienced teachers may be 
less likely to be members of the union and less likely to be active in the union when they are 
members.  Additionally, union contracts are often negotiated months or even years in advance of 
the school year for which they apply.  As a result, the very newest teachers never had a vote on 
how the salary schedule would be structured.  School district administrators, however, are likely 
to be sensitive to market conditions for new school teachers since this is when teachers are most 
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mobile.  Thus, we might expect unionized school districts with strong union bargaining power to 
respond to the preferences of experienced (median voter) teachers, whereas nonunion districts or 
union districts where bargaining power is weak may be more responsive to market conditions for 
new teachers. 
Even if the median voter model is not perfectly applicable, it is reasonable to expect that 
unions might increase the salary differential between beginning and experienced teachers.   
Unions might also increase the salary differential between teachers with and without advanced 
degrees.  This shifting in the salary structure may even result in less experienced teachers having 
lower salaries than would be the case in the absence of union negotiations.   
Chambers (1977), Delaney (1985) and Zwerling and Thomason (1995) suggest that 
teachers salaries in a district are positively affected by union activity in nearby districts.  In fact, 
all three studies suggest that the union spillover effect on wages is larger than the direct effect on 
wages of union activity in the district.  This paper often uses the term “union spillovers” to refer 
to the effects that union activity in nearby districts have on teacher salaries in a given district.  
Union spillovers are likely to result from a number of sources including pattern bargaining, 
union threat effects, and the political influence of unions on state and local policymakers.  
More recent studies by Wagner and Porter (2000), Greenbaum (2002), Babcock, Engberg 
and Greenbaum (2005), and Millimet and Rangaprasad (2007) find using spatial econometric 
methods that teacher salaries in a district are also positively influenced by teacher salaries in 
nearby districts.1  In this paper, I often use the term “wage spillovers” to refer to the effects that 
teacher salaries in nearby districts have on teacher salaries in a given district.  These previous 
                                                            
1 Ready and Sandver (1993) also find that salaries are correlated with salaries in nearby districts.  However, their 
analysis is based on OLS and does not account for the simultaneity of salaries for districts in close proximity.  As 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section, appropriate spatial methods account for the simultaneity in 
teacher salaries using instrumental variables. 
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studies consistently find evidence of positive wage spillovers, at least in the states considered.2  
However, each of these studies examines a single state and with the exception of Babcock et al. 
(2005) do not generally focus on the effects of unions.  The current paper makes an important 
contribution to the literature by using a national level dataset to examine the effect of unions on 
teacher salaries in a spatial econometric framework.  There are a number of benefits from a 
multi-state analysis.  First, union effects likely differ across states, and looking at multiple states 
allows us to get a better idea about the average effects of unions in the U.S.  While analyses of 
particular states are certainly important, the average effects across the U.S. are quite important 
for our understanding of the effects of unions.  A second major benefit of a multi-state analysis is 
that it allows us to estimate the effects of state-level union activity variables, which include 
union spillover effects.  This is an important contribution of this paper and a state-level analysis 
would miss this. 
Unions are also likely to affect school districts in ways other than increasing teacher 
salaries.  For one, unions are likely to affect the level of fringe benefits that teachers receive as 
part of their compensation package.  Unions are likely to work toward better health insurance 
benefits, better pension benefits, and greater job security for the teachers they represent.  Unions 
may also affect other school district characteristics such as the student-teacher ratio and the level 
and composition of non-instructional expenditures.  Perhaps most importantly, the overall 
influence of unions may affect the amount that students learn through altering inputs into the 
production of education and by empowering teachers.  The current paper, however, focuses on 
the effect of unions on the salaries that teachers are paid.  Additional effects that unions might 
have on school districts are beyond the scope of this paper. 
                                                            
2 Wagner and Porter (2000) examine school districts in Ohio; Greenbaum (2002) and Babcock et al. (2005) examine 
districts in Pennsylvania; and Millimet and Prangasad (2007) examine districts in Illinois. 
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Empirical Framework 
 Most previous studies of the determinants of teacher salaries do not account for the effect 
of teacher salaries in nearby districts.  The usual estimation equation in these studies is given by: 
(1) ܻ ൌ ܺߚ ൅ ݑ, 
where ܻ is an ݊ ൈ 1 vector of teacher salaries (usually measured in logs), ܺ is an ݊ ൈ ݇ matrix of 
explanatory variables, ߚ is a ݇ ൈ 1 vector of parameters, and ݑ is a mean zero error term 
assumed to be i.i.d. across observations. 
In this paper I consider the possibility that teacher salaries are spatially correlated after 
controlling for other determinants of teacher salaries.  The primary concern is that teacher 
salaries in a district may be affected by teacher salaries in neighboring districts, i.e., there might 
be wage spillovers.  This type of spatial dependence is likely to occur for several reasons.  First, 
school districts likely compete with nearby districts for quality teachers.  If one district offers 
salary levels substantially below that of nearby districts, they will have difficulty hiring and 
retaining quality teachers.  Thus school district administrators have incentives to keep teacher 
salaries, especially starting salaries, competitive with salaries in nearby districts.  Furthermore, 
comparisons of salaries in nearby districts are almost always used in contract negotiations 
between administrators and teacher unions.  Similarly, many state laws prescribe interest 
arbitration when district administrators and union representatives reach an impasse, and 
decisions are often made on the basis of comparability with other districts.  Thus, spatial 
dependence in teacher salaries is quite likely.  If there is spatial correlation in the dependent 
variable, then methods that do not account for this are likely to produce inconsistent coefficient 
estimates (Anselin 1988).  A second concern is that there may be spatial correlation in the error 
term, say from spatially correlated unobservable characteristics or spatially correlated 
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measurement error in explanatory variables (Kalenkoski and Lacombe 2008).  Failing to account 
for spatial correlation in the error term may result in standard errors that are inconsistently 
estimated, especially for the union activity measures employed in this paper.  While a spatially 
correlated dependent variable and a spatially correlated error term are similar, there are important 
differences.  Spatial correlation in the dependent variable suggests that districts are directly 
responding to each other either through competition or attempts to maintain comparability.  
Spatial correlation in the error term is more indirect and results from nearby districts responding 
similarly to common nearby forces such as state laws. 
The spatial model in this paper can be represented by: 
(2) ܻ ൌ ߩ ଵܹܻ ൅ ܺߚ ൅ ݑ 
 ݑ ൌ ߣ ଶܹݑ ൅ ߝ, 
where ଵܹ and ଶܹ are ݊ ൈ ݊ weighting matrices that specify the structure of the spatial 
correlation for the dependent variable and the error term, ߩ and ߣ are spatial autocorrelation 
coefficients for the dependent variable and the error term, and ߝ is a mean zero error term that is 
i.i.d. across observations.  Some spatial econometric studies only model spatial correlation in the 
dependent variable (by assuming that ߣ ൌ 0) or in the error term (by assuming that ߩ ൌ 0).  
After conducting numerous spatial econometric tests suggested by Anselin et al. (1996), it was 
concluded that it was appropriate to account for spatial correlation in both the dependent variable 
and in the error term.  A number of studies also use the same weight matrix for ଵܹ and ଶܹ, but 
this can lead to identification issues.   
Determining who the relevant neighbors are and how to weight them are important issues 
in spatial econometric studies.  Most studies specify spatial weight matrices based on geographic 
proximity, but other concepts of “nearness” are also possible.  For example, Gerwin (1973) 
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reports that the city of Milwaukee was more concerned with teacher salaries in other large urban 
school districts than in its suburbs.  Thus, one might consider weighting districts by similarity in 
enrollment levels.  The current paper, however, follows the bulk of the previous literature and 
specifies ଵܹ based on the distance between school districts.  For row i of the ଵܹ matrix, districts 
that are more than 50 miles away from i are given zero weight.  In other words districts are only 
considered neighbors if their centroids, i.e., geographic centers, are within 50 miles of each 
other.  Districts within 50 miles of i are weighted based on their inverse distance to i, so that 
nearer districts are given more weight than districts further away.  Several additional weight 
matrices were also explored for ଵܹsuch as altering the distance cutoff to 30 miles and 100 miles 
and equally weighting all districts within the cutoff.  The 50 mile cutoff was ultimately chosen to 
keep the group of neighbors as tight as possible while minimizing the number of districts that 
must be excluded due to not having any neighbor in the sample.  The inverse distance 
specification was chosen based on the assumption that salaries in a district are most strongly 
affected by salaries in other districts that are closest to it and the effect attenuates with distance.  
I also explored using an inverse-distance weight matrix with a 50 mile cutoff that also requires 
neighbors to be in the same state, but the interstate neighbors were ultimately retained because 
wage spillovers are likely to spread across state borders.  The results are for the most part 
qualitatively robust across various weight matrices.  The weight matrix for the spatial error term, 
ଶܹ, is specified such that for district i all other districts in the same state are treated as neighbors 
and given equal weight.  This specification captures spatial error correlation due to common 
unobserved factors within states.  Each weight matrix is also structured so that the elements in 
each row sum to unity and all diagonal elements are equal to zero so that a district cannot be its 
own neighbor.  In other words, ଵܹܻ is a distance-weighted average of teacher salaries in nearby 
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districts, and ଶܹݑ is an un-weighted average of the error terms of other districts in the same 
state.   
 It should be clear that teacher salaries in neighboring districts are hypothesized to be 
simultaneously determined.  Salaries in district j affect salaries in district i, but salaries in district 
i also affect salaries in district j.  Because of the simultaneity involved, using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) to estimate the spatial model is inappropriate.  Instead, instrumental variable 
methods are used.  More specifically, the present paper estimates the spatial models by the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) 
using the Spatial Econometrics Toolbox for MATLAB developed by James LeSage and 
described in LeSage (1999).  The GMM estimator instruments for ଵܹܻ using ଵܹܺ and ଵܹଶܺ  as 
instruments.  In other words, the estimator instruments for salaries in nearby districts using the 
distance-weighted averages of the other explanatory variables in nearby districts along with the 
distance-weighted averages of their neighbors’ neighbors’ characteristics.   Kelejian and Prucha 
(1998) outline the conditions under which the GMM estimator provides consistent estimates.     
 
Data 
 The primary data used in this analysis come from the school district survey of the 1999-
2000 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) conducted by the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES) and completed by school district administrators.  Unfortunately, there may be 
potential drawbacks to using cross-sectional data because wage spillovers might not always be 
contemporaneous.  Unions and district administrators often reference contracts negotiated in 
other districts in prior years and contracts often last for multiple years (Babcock et al. 2005).  
Information on when a contract was agreed to might provide additional insights about the nature 
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of wage spillovers, but unfortunately the SASS does not collect this information.  Still, there are 
important insights from the cross-sectional analysis in this paper.  Additional data for this study 
are obtained from the NCES Common Core of Data (CCD), the NCES School District 
Demographics System (SDDS), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics (LAUS), and the NCES Comparable Wage Index (CWI) developed by Taylor and 
Fowler (2006).  The CWI measures the wages in the local labor market of occupations 
comparable to teaching based on microdata from the 2000 decennial Census and is available for 
nearly every district in the SASS.  Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in 
the study and documents the source for each. 
The SASS sample originally includes more than 4600 school districts, or about one fourth 
of all districts in the U.S.  However, a number of observations are lost due to missing data values 
and due to not having a neighbor in the sample within 50 miles.  The final sample includes 4237 
school districts in the 48 contiguous states.  The fact that all districts are not included could pose 
problems for our spatial results since salaries for some of a district’s neighbors are not observed.  
The key assumption is that for each district the neighbors that are observed are not statistically 
different from the ones that are not observed.  In other words, the included neighbors are 
representative of the excluded neighbors.  If so, the GMM estimates will be consistent.  The high 
degree of spatial correlation in both the dependent variable and the error term in the results 
below at least partially alleviates concerns that the included neighbors might not be 
representative of the excluded neighbors. 
 Teacher salaries are investigated for both beginning teachers and experienced teachers 
and come from the 1999-2000 SASS.  Beginning teacher salaries are measured by the base salary 
according to the district’s salary schedule for teachers with no teaching experience and only a 
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bachelor’s degree (BA0).  Salaries for experienced teachers are measured by the base salary on 
the district’s salary schedule for teachers with 20 years of teaching experience and a master’s 
degree related to the teaching field (MA20).3  Individual teachers are sometimes paid amounts 
above that required by the salary schedule for special credentials or extra duties such as coaching 
a sports team.  However, the salary measures in this paper are for the base salary in the district 
and do not include extra pay for special credentials or extra duties.  Beginning teachers in the 
sample have a mean salary of $25,901 while the mean salary for experienced teachers is nearly 
twice that.  There is also greater variation in the salaries of experienced teachers.  The standard 
deviation in salaries for experienced teachers is nearly three times that of beginning teachers, and 
the coefficient of variation (CV) for experienced teachers of 0.232 is more than 1.5 times the CV 
for beginning teachers of 0.147. 
 The regression analysis below includes a number of important explanatory variables.  
The effect of unions is given considerable emphasis in this paper and union activity is measured 
in three different ways.  I first measure union activity by two mutually exclusive indicator 
variables for collective bargaining and the presence of a meet and confer agreement in the 
district.  Meet and confer agreements generally stipulate that district administrators are to meet 
and confer with teacher representatives about salaries, benefits, and working conditions, but they 
do not legally compel the district to reach an agreement with a teachers’ union.  They tend to be 
concentrated in a handful of states with meet and confer laws and weak collective bargaining 
laws.  Because they are not binding on school districts, meet and confer agreements are likely to 
result in less favorable outcomes for teachers.  As seen in Table 1, more than 61 percent of the 
districts engage in collective bargaining, and another eight percent have meet and confer 
                                                            
3 The SASS also reports the salary for teachers with only a bachelor’s degree and ten years of experience (BA10).  
In results not shown, I also examine the determinants of this variable and generally find results that are between the 
results for BA0 and MA20. 
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agreements.  Thus roughly 31 percent of districts have neither.  Previous literature has suggested 
that union activity in neighboring districts has important spillover effects, and the next two 
measures of union activity will produce estimates that include union spillover effects from other 
districts in the same state.  My second measure of union activity is the share of districts in a state 
with a collective bargaining agreement.4  If collective bargaining has important spillover effects 
on teacher salaries for other districts in the state, the effect for the state collective bargaining 
share should be greater than the effect for the collective bargaining indicator variable.  My third 
measure of union activity is the percentage of teachers in a state who are members of a teacher 
union, the effects for which will also include union spillovers.  Unfortunately, union membership 
at the district level is not available, so we cannot compare the effects of state membership 
density to that of district membership density.  Though the second and third measures of union 
activity are both intended to include union spillover effects, they are different measures and 
could produce somewhat different results.  One limitation to the current paper is that all of the 
union activity measures are treated as exogenous.  If union activity is in fact endogenous because 
of simultaneity, omitted variables, or measurement error, coefficient estimates could be biased 
and inconsistent. 
 The analysis also includes a number of other important variables thought to affect teacher 
salaries.  Teachers are expected to require greater compensation for longer school years, so the 
number of days in the school year is expected to have a positive sign.  Teachers generally prefer 
smaller classes, so the student-teacher ratio is expected to have a positive coefficient as found by 
Vedder and Hall (2000).  Secondary teaching is thought to be more difficult and require greater 
skills, so the share of secondary teachers is expected to have a positive coefficient (Walden and 
                                                            
4 I also experimented with measuring union activity by the share of districts in a state with any agreement, i.e., either 
collective bargaining or a meet and confer agreement.  The results are qualitatively similar to the results for the 
share with collective bargaining and are available from the author. 
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Sogutlu 2001).  Districts that have dismissed relatively large numbers of teachers recently are 
expected to have a lower need for teachers and pay less competitive salaries.  Districts that have 
experienced increased enrollments over the previous five years are expected to have a high 
demand for teachers and be willing to pay higher relative salaries (Zwerling and Thomason 
1995).  Similarly, larger districts are expected to pay higher salaries, and the log of district 
enrollment is expected to have a positive coefficient (Walden and Newmark 1995).  A number of 
researchers (e.g. Merrifield 1999 and Taylor forthcoming) suggest that monopsony power in the 
local teacher labor market adversely affects teacher salaries.  To account for this, the regressions 
include the local labor market teacher employment Herfindahl Index (HI) as a measure of 
employer concentration.  The HI is computed as the sum of the squared market shares of all 
school districts in a local labor market, including ones not in the sample, and is expected to have 
a negative coefficient.  Martin (forthcoming) suggests that teachers require compensating 
differentials to teach students from disadvantaged backgrounds, so the share of students who are 
white is expected to have a negative effect, while the share of students that are low income as 
measured by free or reduced lunch eligibility is expected to have a positive effect.  The log of the 
Comparable Wage Index is included to control for the relative cost of living in a particular labor 
market and also serve as a proxy for the opportunity cost of teaching in a given market (Stoddard  
2005).  A higher level of comparable wages is expected to increase teacher salaries.  More 
educated residents are thought to have greater demand for education, so the share of adults (age 
25+) living in the district with at least a high school degree and the share of adults with at least a 
bachelor’s degree are both expected to have positive coefficients (Taylor forthcoming).  
Residents with children are expected to demand greater spending on education, so the share of 
households with at least one child under age 18 is expected to have a positive effect (Easton 
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1988).  Renters are thought to be more likely than homeowners to support spending on 
education, perhaps in part because renters do not believe that they bear the burden of local 
property taxes to finance education, so the share of households who are homeowners is expected 
to have a negative effect (Martinez-Vasquez and Sjoquist 1988).  The unemployment rate in the 
county in which the district is located is also included to capture local labor market conditions.  
Higher unemployment is likely to make it more difficult to find a well-paying career outside of 
teaching and is expected to have a negative effect on teacher salaries (Taylor forthcoming).  
Finally, a number of studies (e.g. Lentz 1998 and Winters 2009) suggest that districts with a 
greater property tax base pay higher teacher salaries.  Therefore, the log of the median value of 
owner-occupied housing in the district is included as a proxy for the property tax base and is 
expected to have a positive effect.  
 
Empirical Results 
 I begin by estimating equation (1) using OLS, but theory and numerous empirical tests 
suggest that spatial correlation is likely to be present in both the dependent variable and the error 
term.  Therefore, I also estimate the spatial model of equation (2) using GMM.  Results that 
measure union activity by collective bargaining and meet and confer indicator variables are 
discussed first and reported in Tables 2 and 3 for experienced and beginning teachers, 
respectively.  Tables 4 and 5 re-estimate the equations in Tables 2 and 3 measuring union 
activity by the share of districts in the state with a collective bargaining agreement.  Tables 6 and 
7 re-estimate the equations in Tables 2 and 3 measuring union activity by the share of teachers in 
the state who are members of a teacher union.   
16 
 
Importantly, the marginal effects of the exogenous variables in the spatial models are not 
equal to their coefficient estimates.  In the spatial results below, I report coefficient estimates, 
standard errors in parentheses, and average marginal effects in brackets computed as described in 
the Appendix.  For ease of discussion, I often refer to the average marginal effects simply as the 
marginal effects, and I focus on these when discussing magnitudes for these variables.  This is 
important because the marginal effects for some variables below are more than twice the size of 
the coefficient estimates.  Note that coefficient estimates for the OLS equations can be directly 
interpreted as marginal effects because of the linearity assumption. 
Spatial Correlation Coefficients 
 The results confirm that salaries are spatially dependent for both experienced teachers 
and beginning teachers even after controlling for many other variables that explain teacher 
salaries.  The results in column 2 of Tables 2 and 3 report statistically significant spatially lagged 
dependent variable coefficients (ߩ) of 0.64 and 0.69 for experienced and beginning teachers, 
respectively.  According to these estimates, a one percent increase in the distance-weighted 
average of experienced teacher salaries in nearby districts increases salaries for experienced 
teachers in a given district by 0.64 percent.  For beginning teachers, the effect of salaries in 
nearby districts is even stronger; a one percent increase in the distance-weighted average of 
salaries for beginning teachers in nearby districts increases salaries for beginning teachers by 
0.69 percent.  The spatial error coefficient (ߣ) is also statistically significant for both experienced 
and beginning teachers.  The spatial error coefficient is 0.60 for experienced teachers in Table 2 
and 0.62 for beginning teachers in Table 3.   
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Collective Bargaining and Meet and Confer Indicators 
 Estimating the effects of teacher unions on teacher salaries is a primary concern of this 
paper.  Previous studies have usually found that unions increase teacher salaries, at least for 
experienced teachers, but these studies do not generally account for spatial dependence in teacher 
salaries.  For experienced teachers, the OLS results in this paper suggest that the presence of 
collective bargaining increases teacher salaries by roughly 10 percent.  Accounting for the spatial 
nature of the data, however, the average marginal effect of collective bargaining for experienced 
teachers is only 0.037, suggesting that collective bargaining in a district increases salaries for 
experienced teachers by about four percent.  Thus, it appears that failing to account for spatial 
dependence causes one to overstate the effects of collective bargaining in a district on the 
salaries of experienced teachers in that district.  However, because collective bargaining is 
measured at the district level but may have spillover effects across districts, some of the observed 
wage spillover in Table 2 may be a union spillover.  Later on, I will measure union activity by 
two state-level variables whose observed effects include union spillovers, the share of districts in 
a state with collective bargaining and the share of workers in a state who are members of a 
teacher union. 
 For beginning teachers accounting for spatial dependence has a similar effect on 
coefficient estimates for collective bargaining but on a much smaller scale.  OLS suggests a 
small but statistically significant effect of collective bargaining, just less than one percent.  The 
spatial model, however, reports an even smaller (negative) coefficient that is not statistically 
different from zero.  Thus, consistent with previous literature, the results in Tables 2 and 3 
suggest that collective bargaining increases teacher salaries for experienced teachers but not for 
beginning teachers. 
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 Tables 2 and 3 also include an indicator variable for the presence of a meet and confer 
agreement in the district.  For experienced teachers the meet and confer effect is small and 
statistically insignificant in the OLS specification.  For the spatial results, however, meet and 
confer agreements have a significantly positive effect for experienced teachers with a marginal 
effect estimate of 0.026, which is slightly smaller than the effect of collective bargaining.  For 
beginning teachers the meet and confer effect in the OLS specification is actually negative and 
statistically significant though relatively small.  Accounting for spatial dependence, though, the 
meet and confer effect for beginning teachers is very small, positive, and not statistically 
significant.   
Additional Explanatory Variables 
 The results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that additional variables affect teacher salaries as 
well.  These include characteristics of the teachers, the school district, the students, the local 
residents, and the local labor market.  Importantly, the results for the spatial models are often 
quite different from the OLS results for the non-spatial models in the first column of the tables.  
Here I discuss the results for the spatial models in the second columns of Tables 2 and 3.  
Because the dependent variables are measured in logs, the marginal effects can be loosely 
interpreted as percentage changes.  Note, however, that a few variables have been rescaled for 
estimation and presentation purposes.  The length of the school year has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the salaries of both experienced and beginning teachers with 
marginal effects of 0.096 and 0.085, respectively.  The student-teacher ratio has a positive effect 
on the salaries of experienced teachers with a marginal effect of 0.106 that is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.  However, the estimates suggest that increasing the student-
teacher ratio by ten would only increase teacher salaries by about one percent, so the effect is 
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relatively small.  For beginning teachers the student-teacher ratio effect is even smaller and not 
statistically different from zero.  For both experienced and beginning teachers, salaries increase 
with the percentage of teachers who teach secondary grades, with significant marginal effects of 
0.050 and 0.030, respectively.  This suggests that secondary teaching is either less pleasant or 
requires greater skills or greater effort than teaching primary grades (Walden and Sogutlu 2001).  
The percentage of teachers dismissed in the previous year has a negative but statistically 
insignificant coefficient for both experienced and beginning teachers.  Consistent with 
expectations, enrollment and the growth in enrollment both have significantly positive effects on 
the salaries of experienced and beginning teachers.  Enrollment growth has marginal effects of 
0.024 for experienced teachers and 0.023 for beginning teachers.  The log of enrollment has 
marginal effects of 0.024 for experienced teachers and 0.015 for beginning teachers.  This may 
suggest that larger school districts are worse places to work and require compensating 
differentials (Walden and Newmark 1995).  The Herfindahl Index has a statistically significant 
negative effect for both experienced and beginning teachers with marginal effects of -0.049 and  
-0.042, respectively.  The share of students who are white has a negative and statistically 
significant effect for both experienced and beginning teachers with marginal effects of -0.031 
and -0.033, respectively.  This is consistent with Martin (forthcoming) who finds that teachers 
require positive compensating wage differentials to work in districts with a higher percentage of 
minority students.  The share of low-income students has a small negative coefficient for both 
that is not statistically significant. 
 The results also suggest that teacher salaries are affected by local labor market conditions 
and the local demand for education.  The log of the comparable wage index, which measures 
teachers’ opportunity cost of teaching in the local market, has a statistically significant effect for 
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both experienced and beginning teachers, with marginal effects of 0.392 and 0.269.  Thus 
teachers require higher wages to teach in labor markets that pay higher wages to other 
occupations.  Increases in the share of the adult population with a college degree significantly 
increases salaries for both experienced and beginning teachers, with marginal effects of 0.191 
and 0.118.  The share of the population with a high school degree or higher, however, has a 
negative coefficient for both experienced and beginning teachers, though the effect is only 
statistically significant for beginning teachers with a marginal effect of -0.086.  The share of 
households in a district with children under age 18 results in significantly lower salaries for 
experienced teachers, with a marginal effect of -0.118.  This is in contrast to expectations that 
households with children would demand greater education services and be willing to support 
higher teacher salaries.  For beginning teachers, the effect of the share of households with 
children is small and statistically insignificant.  The share of households in a district who are 
homeowners has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on the salaries of both 
experienced and beginning teachers.  The county unemployment rate has a positive coefficient 
for both experienced and beginning teachers, but the effect is only statistically significant for 
experienced teachers with a marginal effect of 0.340.  However, the positive effect of 
unemployment on teacher salaries is somewhat unexpected.  Finally, the log of the median of 
home values in the district has a statistically significant positive effect on the salaries of both 
experienced and beginning teachers with marginal effects of 0.031 and 0.023.  This suggests that 
wealthier districts demand greater spending on education and this translates into higher teacher 
salaries. 
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Measuring Union Activity by the State Share of Districts with Collective Bargaining 
 Tables 4 and 5 present the results of re-estimating the equations in Tables 2 and 3 
measuring union activity by the share of districts in a state with a collective bargaining 
agreement.  For the sake of brevity, I report only results for the spatial variables and the state 
collective bargaining share.  The results for the additional explanatory variables are qualitatively 
similar to the corresponding results in Tables 2 and 3 and are available from the author in an 
unpublished appendix.  Measuring union activity by the state collective bargaining share, the 
spatial lag coefficient decreases to 0.53 for experienced teachers in the second column of Table 
4.  This seems to confirm the earlier hypothesis that the spatial lag coefficient in Table 2 was 
partially capturing union spillovers.  For beginning teachers, however, the spatial lag coefficient 
of 0.69 in Table 5 is identical to that in Table 3.  The spatial lag coefficient is now significantly 
larger for beginning teachers than for experienced teachers.  This result is likely due to the 
greater mobility of new than experienced teachers.  District administrators may be especially 
concerned with keeping beginning salaries competitive in order to be able to hire and retain 
beginning teachers.  Because experienced teachers are usually less mobile, spatial dependence in 
salaries for experienced teachers may result more from union efforts to keep salaries 
comparables to those in nearby districts.  The spatial error coefficients are again statistically 
significant for both experienced and beginning teachers with estimates of 0.65 and 0.63, 
respectively. 
 The results in Table 4 also suggest that the share of districts with collective bargaining 
has a statistically significant effect on salaries of experienced teachers, with a marginal effect of 
0.163 in the spatial model.  This is more than four times the effect of collective bargaining in the 
second column of Table 2 suggesting that the spillover effects from collective bargaining are 
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considerably larger than the direct effect of collective bargaining in the district.  For beginning 
teachers, the share of districts with collective bargaining has a positive coefficient in Table 5, but 
the effect is small and not statistically significant at conventional levels.  This suggests that the 
state collective bargaining share likely has at best a weak effect on the salaries of beginning 
teachers.  In results not shown, I also estimated regressions that simultaneously included both an 
indicator variable for collective bargaining in a district and the state share of districts with 
collective bargaining.  In these regressions the effects for the indicator variable were virtually 
zero and statistically insignificant, while the effects for the state collective bargaining share were 
virtually identical to the results in Tables 4 and 5.  This suggests that being in a heavily 
unionized state has a much more important effect on salaries for experienced teachers than being 
in a district with collective bargaining. 
Measuring Union Activity by State Union Membership 
 Following Zwerling and Thomason (1995) I also explore measuring union activity by the 
percentage of teachers in a state who are members of a teacher union.  Tables 6 and 7 present the 
results of re-estimating the equations in Tables 2 and 3 measuring union activity by state union 
membership.  Again for the sake of brevity, I only report results for the spatial variables and the 
state union membership density.  Results for the additional variables are qualitatively similar to 
previous results and are available from the author.  Like the share of districts in a state with 
collective bargaining, the effect of the state union membership density includes union spillover 
effects.  These two measures, however, could produce different results.  For example, the state 
membership density could have a stronger effect if it is a better measure of union strength.  A 
union bargaining in a district in which a large percentage of the teachers are union members is 
likely to have more power in contract negotiations.  Furthermore, union members may be more 
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active politically, even in districts without a collective bargaining agreement.  The votes of 
teachers can be quite important in state and local elections, especially in school board elections, 
where a relatively low percentage of the general population turns out to vote, but a larger 
percentage of teachers do (Moe 2006).  When teachers are highly organized, school boards may 
feel significant pressure to concede higher salaries and other union demands. 
 The spatial lag and spatial error results in Tables 6 and 7 measuring union activity by the 
state membership share are very similar to the corresponding estimates in Tables 4 and 5.  For 
experienced teachers the state membership density has a significant marginal effect of 0.347 in 
Table 6.  For beginning teachers the state membership density is significant at the ten percent 
level, with a marginal effect of 0.098.  This is the first statistically significant effect of union 
activity on beginning teacher salaries in this paper.  The marginal effects for the state 
membership density in Tables 6 and 7 are larger in magnitude than the marginal effects for the 
collective bargaining share in Tables 4 and 5, but we must also account for the fact that the state 
membership density is less dispersed than the state collective bargaining share to assess their 
relative impacts.  The state collective bargaining share has a minimum value of zero, a maximum 
value of one, and a standard deviation of 0.410, while the state membership density ranges 
between 0.312 and 0.992 and has a standard deviation of 0.185.  Therefore, according to the 
second column estimates in Tables 4 and 6, moving from a state with no collective bargaining to 
a state with complete collective bargaining coverage would increase salaries for experienced 
teachers by 17.8 percent, while moving from the state with the lowest membership density to the 
state with the greatest membership density would increase salaries for experienced teachers by 
28.2 percent.  Alternatively, moving from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard 
deviation above the mean of union activity increases salaries for experienced teachers by 14.6 
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percent for the collective bargaining share and by 15.4 percent for the state membership density.  
Moving from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of union activity increases salaries for 
experienced teachers by 15.6 percent for the collective bargaining share and by 12.5 percent for 
the state membership density.  Thus, although the two measures differ, their estimated impacts 
on the salaries of experienced teachers are both fairly large. 
 
Conclusion 
 Using a national level dataset this paper has shown that salaries for both experienced and 
beginning teachers are considerably affected by teacher salaries in nearby districts, though the 
effect is larger for beginning teachers.  Investigations of the determinants of teacher salaries that 
ignore spatial dependence are likely to be mis-specified.  The results of the spatial regressions 
suggest that a number of other important factors affect teacher salaries.  The effect of unions on 
teacher salaries is given considerable attention in this paper and several measures of union 
activity are explored.  Including union spillover effects, I find that collective bargaining and 
union membership density in a state increase salaries for experienced teachers by as much as 18 
and 28 percent, respectively, but the estimated effects on the salaries of beginning teachers are 
much smaller.  Given the relatively weak bargaining position of beginning relative to 
experienced teachers within unions, this result is not surprising.   
 
 
  
25 
 
Appendix: Computation of Average Marginal Effects 
 
 The marginal effects of the exogenous variables in equation (2) are not equal to the 
parameters in vector ߚ.  Rewriting equation (2) as: 
(3) ܻ ൌ ሾܫ െ ߩ ଵܹሿିଵܺߚ ൅ ሾܫ െ ߩ ଶܹሿିଵݑ, 
it is easily seen that the partial derivative of ܻ with respect to a single exogenous variable ܺ௞ 
(݊ ൈ 1) is given by: 
(4)  ߲ܻ/߲ܺ௞ᇱ ൌ ቈ
ങೊభ/ങ೉భೖ    ങೊభ/ങ೉మೖ …  ങೊభ/ങ೉೙ೖങೊమ/ങ೉భೖ    ങೊమ/ങ೉మೖ …  ങೊమ/ങ೉೙ೖ  ڭ                           ڭ               ڰ            ڭ       
ങೊ೙/ങ೉భೖ    ങೊ೙/ങ೉మೖ …  ങೊ೙/ങ೉೙ೖ
቉ ൌ ߚ௞ሾܫ െ ߩ ଵܹሿିଵ. 
Therefore, the marginal effect on teacher salaries of an explanatory variable such as union 
activity is ߚ௞ሾܫ െ ߩ ଵܹሿିଵ.  If ܺ௞ is measured at the district level, then the average marginal 
effect of an increase in ܺ௞ in a district on teacher salaries in that district is equal to ߚ௞ times the 
average of the diagonal elements of the ሾܫ െ ߩ ଵܹሿିଵ matrix.  More formally, setting 
(5)  ܣ ൌ ሾܫ െ ߩ ଵܹሿିଵ ൌ ቈ
ೌభభ    ೌభమ …  ೌభ೙ೌమభ    ೌమమ …  ೌమ೙  ڭ           ڭ     ڰ      ڭ 
ೌ೙భ    ೌ೙మ …  ೌ೙೙
቉, 
the average marginal effect of an increase in ܺ௞ in a district on teacher salaries in that district is 
ߚ௞ ଵ௡ ∑ ௝ܽ௝௡௝ୀଵ .  If ܺ௞ is measured at a level of concentration larger than the district, such as the 
state, then the average marginal effect of an increase in ܺ௞ at the state level on teacher salaries in 
a district is equal to ߚ௞ ଵ௡ ∑ ∑ ݀௜௝ܽ௜௝௡௜ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ , where ݀௜௝ is equal to one if i = j or if i and j are in the 
same state and are defined as neighbors according to the spatial weight matrix (i.e. within 50 
miles of each other in this paper).  Because ܺ௞ is measured at the state level, the marginal effect 
of ܺ௞ on ܻ for district i includes not only the direct effect of district i but also the indirect effects 
of “neighboring” districts in the same state.  Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003) show that if ܺ௞ 
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does not vary among neighboring districts (e.g. the variable is measured at the state level and all 
neighbors are in the same state), then the average marginal effect of a unit increase in ܺ௞ is equal 
to ߚ௞/ሺ1 െ ߩሻ.  We can think of ଵ௡ ∑ ∑ ݀௜௝ܽ௜௝௡௜ୀଵ௡௝ୀଵ  as a spatial multiplier with both 
ଵ
௡ ∑ ௝ܽ௝௡௝ୀଵ  
and 1/ሺ1 െ ߩሻ as special cases. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Data Sources 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Salary BA0 25,901 3,802 16,350 43,085 SASS
Salary MA20 48,986 11,349 20,775 98,207 SASS
Collective Bargaining 0.612 0.487 0 1 SASS
Meet and Confer 0.078 0.268 0 1 SASS
State Collective Bargaining Share 0.567 0.410 0 1 SASS
State Union Membership  0.765 0.185 0.312 0.992 SASS
Days of School 178.614 4.691 142 288 SASS
Student-Teacher Ratio 15.086 3.904 3.088 107.241 SASS
Share of Secondary Teachers 0.386 0.158 0 1 SASS
Share of Teachers Dismissed 0.007 0.021 0 0.491 SASS
%  Enrollment, 1994-1999 (/100) 0.039 0.174 -0.658 4.452 CCD
Log Enrollment 7.787 1.433 3.367 13.905 SASS
Herfindahl Index 0.158 0.145 0.013 1 CCD
Share of White Students 0.763 0.272 0 1 SASS
Share of Low Income Students 0.397 0.250 0 1 SASS
Log of Comparable Wage Index  -0.118 0.123 -0.352 0.218 CWI
Share HS Plus 0.796 0.099 0.201 1 SDDS
Share BA Plus 0.194 0.118 0.016 1 SDDS
Share w/ Children<18 0.319 0.054 0.123 1 SDDS
Share of Homeowners 0.734 0.115 0 0.970 SDDS
County Unemployment Rate 0.046 0.026 0.007 0.301 LAUS
Log of Median Home Value 11.385 0.531 9.547 13.604 SDDS
Note: The dataset contains observations on 4237 school districts included in the 1999-2000 
SASS. 
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Table 2: Log Salary Regressions for MA20 with Union Indicator Variables 
  1 2 
Spatial Lag () 0.6441*** 
(0.0403) 
Spatial Error () 0.5958*** 
(0.0018) 
Collective Bargaining 0.0966*** 0.0336*** 
(0.0054) (0.0062) 
[0.0368] 
Meet and Confer 0.0030 0.0236*** 
(0.0083) (0.0067) 
[0.0259] 
Days of School (/100) 0.3410*** 0.0872** 
(0.0451) (0.0373) 
[0.0957] 
Student-Teacher Ratio (/100) -0.1540** 0.0963* 
(0.0636) (0.0516) 
[0.1057] 
Share of Secondary Teachers 0.0590*** 0.0453*** 
(0.0135) (0.0111) 
[0.0497] 
Share of Teachers Dismissed -0.0863 -0.0370 
(0.0984) (0.0737) 
[-0.0406] 
%  Enrollment, 1994-1999 (/100) 0.0166 0.0220** 
(0.0126) (0.0097) 
[0.0242] 
Log of Enrollment 0.0224*** 0.0215*** 
(0.0020) (0.0017) 
[0.0236] 
Herfindahl Index -0.1083*** -0.0274** 
(0.0152) (0.0128) 
[-0.0494] 
Share of White Students -0.0150 -0.0286*** 
(0.0109) (0.0089) 
[-0.0314] 
Share of Low Income Students -0.0505*** -0.0115 
(0.0114) (0.0087) 
[-0.0126] 
Log of Comparable Wage Index 0.7999*** 0.2172*** 
(0.0264) (0.0281) 
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[0.3920] 
Share HS Plus -0.0297 -0.0385 
(0.0379) (0.0301) 
[-0.0422] 
Share BA Plus 0.0500 0.1741*** 
(0.0309) (0.0244) 
[0.1910] 
Share w/ Children<18 -0.3364*** -0.1079*** 
(0.0405) (0.0318) 
[-0.1184] 
Share of Homeowners 0.0219 -0.0030 
(0.0217) (0.0170) 
[-0.0033] 
County Unemployment Rate 0.8188*** 0.2408*** 
(0.0917) (0.0755) 
[0.3399] 
Log of Median Home Value 0.0720*** 0.0285*** 
(0.0080) (0.0073) 
[0.0313] 
Adjusted R2 0.6177 0.7878 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and column 2 is estimated by GMM.  
The dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with 20 years of 
experience and a Master’s degree.  Standard errors are in parentheses and 
average marginal effects are in brackets for the spatial model.   
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
  
34 
 
Table 3: Log Salary Regressions for BA0 with Union Indicator Variables 
  1  2  
Spatial Lag () 0.6898*** 
(0.0481) 
Spatial Error () 0.6190*** 
(0.0072) 
Collective Bargaining 0.0095** -0.0039 
(0.0039) (0.0040) 
[-0.0043] 
Meet and Confer -0.0181*** 0.0052 
(0.0061) (0.0047) 
[0.0058] 
Days of School (/100) 0.1859*** 0.0757*** 
(0.0327) (0.0257) 
[0.0848] 
Student-Teacher Ratio (/100) -0.1197*** 0.0077 
(0.0462) (0.0356) 
[0.0086] 
Share of Secondary Teachers 0.0238** 0.0271*** 
(0.0098) (0.0076) 
[0.0303] 
Share of Teachers Dismissed 0.0302 -0.0661 
(0.0715) (0.0507) 
[-0.0741] 
%  Enrollment, 1994-1999 (/100) 0.0234** 0.0204*** 
(0.0092) (0.0066) 
[0.0228] 
Log of Enrollment 0.0192*** 0.0133*** 
(0.0015) (0.0011) 
[0.0149] 
Herfindahl Index -0.0752*** -0.0212** 
(0.0110) (0.0089) 
[-0.0416] 
Share of White Students -0.0381*** -0.0294*** 
(0.0079) (0.0062) 
[-0.0330] 
Share of Low Income Students -0.0278*** -0.0068 
(0.0083) (0.0060) 
[-0.0076] 
Log of Comparable Wage Index 0.5851*** 0.1372*** 
(0.0192) (0.0201) 
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[0.2690] 
Share HS Plus -0.2138*** -0.0765*** 
(0.0276) (0.0210) 
[-0.0858] 
Share BA Plus 0.0824*** 0.1053*** 
(0.0225) (0.0168) 
[0.1180] 
Share w/ Children<18 -0.1906*** -0.0005 
(0.0294) (0.0219) 
[-0.0006] 
Share of Homeowners 0.0521*** -0.0134 
(0.0158) (0.0118) 
[-0.0151] 
County Unemployment Rate 0.4302*** 0.0708 
(0.0666) (0.0522) 
[0.1055] 
Log of Median Home Value 0.0412*** 0.0204*** 
(0.0058) (0.0051) 
[0.0229] 
Adjusted R2 0.5581 0.7799 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and column 2 is estimated by GMM.  
The dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with no 
experience and only a Bachelor’s degree.  Standard errors are in parentheses 
and average marginal effects are in brackets for the spatial model.   
** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Log Salary Regressions for MA20 with State Collective Bargaining Share 
  1  2  
Spatial Lag () 0.5316*** 
(0.0543) 
Spatial Error () 0.6474*** 
(0.0014) 
State Collective Bargaining Share 0.1747*** 0.0837*** 
(0.0062) (0.0166) 
[0.1634] 
Adjusted R2 0.6504 0.7876 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and column 2 is estimated by GMM.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with 20 years of experience 
and a Master’s degree.  Regressions also include the additional non-union 
explanatory variables in Table 2.  Standard errors are in parentheses and average 
marginal effects are in brackets for the spatial model.  *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Log Salary Regressions for BA0 with State Collective Bargaining Share 
  1  2  
Spatial Lag () 0.6898*** 
(0.0503) 
Spatial Error () 0.6300*** 
(0.0069) 
State Collective Bargaining Share 0.0500*** 0.0129 
(0.0046) (0.0081) 
[0.0363] 
Adjusted R2 0.5675 0.7795 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and column 2 is estimated by GMM.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with no experience and only 
a Bachelor’s degree.  Regressions also include the additional non-union explanatory 
variables in Table 2.  Standard errors are in parentheses and average marginal 
effects are in brackets for the spatial model.  *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 6: Log Salary Regressions for MA20 with State Union Membership Density 
  1  2  
Spatial Lag () 0.5190*** 
(0.0611) 
Spatial Error () 0.6766*** 
(0.0013) 
State Union Membership Density 0.3815*** 0.1822*** 
(0.0140) (0.0436) 
[0.3471] 
Adjusted R2 0.6463 0.7866 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and column 2 is estimated by GMM.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with 20 years of experience 
and a Master’s degree.  Regressions also include the additional non-union 
explanatory variables in Table 2.  Standard errors are in parentheses and average 
marginal effects are in brackets for the spatial model.  *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Log Salary Regressions for BA0 with State Union Membership Density 
  1  2  
Spatial Lag () 0.6649*** 
(0.0557) 
Spatial Error () 0.6558*** 
(0.0064) 
State Union Membership Density 0.1586*** 0.0371* 
(0.0103) (0.0218) 
[0.0975] 
Adjusted R2 0.5791 0.7790 
Notes: Column 1 is estimated by OLS and column 2 is estimated by GMM.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the salary for teachers with no experience and only 
a Bachelor’s degree.  Regressions also include the additional non-union explanatory 
variables in Table 2.  Standard errors are in parentheses and average marginal 
effects are in brackets for the spatial model.  * Significant at 10%; *** Significant 
at 1%. 
 
 
 
